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Kesler: Ramifications of the 1997 DWI/Felony Prior Record Level Amendment

NOTES

RAMIFICATIONS OF THE 1997 DWI I
FELONY PRIOR RECORD LEVEL
AMENDMENT TO THE STRUCTURED
SENTENCING ACT: STATE OF
NORTH CAROLINA v. TANYA
WATTS GENTRY
I.

INTRODUCTION

An officer from the Lexington Police Department stopped
Tanya Watts Gentry on December 31, 1997 for speeding and running a stop sign in the city of Lexington, North Carolina.1 The
officer, noticing that she appeared to be confused and smelled of
alcohol, "formed the opinion that she was impaired due to consuming alcoholic beverages."2 At the police station, an intoxilyzer
breath test indicated that Tanya Watts Gentry had a .15 blood
3
alcohol content.
Tanya Gentry was arrested and charged with habitual
impaired driving in violation of G.S. 20-138.5,' because it was
found that she had been convicted of three prior DWI5 offenses
within the past seven years. 6 She pled guilty to that charge on
March 11, 1998.'
At this point in the story, everything had run according to the
General Statutes adopted by the North Carolina legislature. The
1. From the syllabus of: State v. Gentry, No. COA98-1225, 1999 N.C. App.
LEXIS 916, (Sept. 21, 1999).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-138.5 (Supp. 1998)-Titled "Habitual impaired
driving."
5. DWI is an acronym for the offense of "driving while intoxicated."
6. Gentry, No. COA98-1225, 1999 N.C. App. LEXIS 916.
7. Id.
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legislature defined a crime in G.S. 20-138.5,8 and the court performed its function and found the defendant guilty by her own
admission. However, as the court entered the sentencing phase
the process did not go as smoothly. The story hit a land mine,
unknowingly planted by the legislature, and it exploded into the
North Carolina Court of Appeals.
At sentencing, the State presented Gentry's criminal record,
which included four previous misdemeanor convictions, a prior felony conviction, and the three prior DWI convictions.' The DWI
convictions were the same charges, which formed the basis for the
habitual, impaired driving charge. Over the objection of the
defendant, the court took into consideration, for sentencing purposes, all of the defendant's seven prior misdemeanors, which
included the three DWI convictions.1 ° The problem, according to
the defendant, was that the court counted these previous DWI
convictions against her twice:
Defendant argue[d] that the State used her three prior DWI convictions to prove an element of the offense of habitual driving
while impaired, a felony which carries a higher punishment than
the maximum of 150 days for misdemeanor DWI. Defendant contend[ed] that 'it is contrary to the laws of this state' to use again
the DWI convictions to add points to her prior record level and
thereby increase her sentence.1 1
Thus, according to the sentencing procedures set forth by the
legislature, 2 Tanya Gentry was looking at a presumptive sentence of 20 to 25 months, rather than the 17 to 21 months she
would have received had the trial court not used the DWI convictions to increase her prior record level.13
It is the purpose of this note to examine pertinent general
statutes and case law to determine whether using previous DWI
convictions as both elements in habitual impaired driving and
towards the defendant's prior record level is truly "contrary to the
laws of this state". 4 First, this note will look at the 1997 amendment to the Structured Sentencing Act, and how its effects led to
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
felony
13.
14.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-138.5.
Gentry, No. COA98-1225, 1999 N.C. App. LEXIS 916.
Id.
Id.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.14(c) (1997)-Titled "Prior record level for
sentencing."
Gentry, No. COA98-1225, 1999 N.C. App. LEXIS 916.
Id.
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the controversy in Gentry. Next, this note will examine an overview of North Carolina's jurisprudence of the habitual felon statutes and the habitual impaired driving statute in order to provide
a look at the attitude of the North Carolina courts towards these
statutes. After examining what led up to the controversy in State
v. Gentry and the law purportedly governing the situation, this
note will review the Court of Appeals decision.
II.

PROBLEMS OF THE

1997 DWI

AMENDMENT

It is an unavoidable consequence of today's society that modern statutory schemes have become a complex labyrinth of procedure. Statutes of common purpose are linked together and they
depend on each other to carry out the intent of the legislature.
This is especially true in criminal statutes dealing with felony
crimes and their sentencing. 15 The statutes set forth elements of
a felony, preventing some sort of behavior at the behest of the legislature. Once these elements are proven, the correlating punishment comes from the sentencing statutes, all in furtherance of the
legislature's intent of general order. When the legislature
changes procedures or some other function in these dependent
statutes, it is very likely to have an effect on the operation of the
whole.
Sometimes the effect of changes within the statutory scheme
of dependent statutes results in unexpected glitches in the intent
of the legislature. 16 Such is the case with the 1997 amendment to
the Structured Sentencing Act proposed by House Bill 183,17 in
15. See generally Chapters 7A, 10A, 14, 15A, 15B, 18B, 20, 21, 23, 48, 53, 58,
62, 63, 65, 66, 70, 75, 75A, 75D, 76, 78A, 78C, 78D, 80, 90, 93A, 95, 97, 105, 106,
108A, 113, 120, 130A, 133, 136, 143, 148, 157, and 163 of the North Carolina
General Statutes. These are North Carolina's statutes that create felony
offenses. All of these crimes are punished in accordance with the procedures set
forth in Chapter 15A, the Structured Sentencing Act. When anything in Chapter
15A is amended, the operation of the whole may be affected.
16. Gentry, No. COA98-1225, 1999 N.C. App. LEXIS 916.
17. Session Law 1997-486 (H 183) reads in pertinent part as follows:
A BILL TO BE ENTITLED AN ACT TO INCLUDE PRIOR IMPAIRED
DRIVING CONVICTIONS IN FELONY PRIOR RECORD LEVEL
CALCULATION, TO PROVIDE FOR AN INDEFINITE CIVIL
SUSPENSIONS OF A DRIVERS LICENSE WHEN A DRIVER IS
CHARGED WITH AN IMPAIRED DRIVING OFFENSE WHILE
ANOTHER IMPAIRED DRIVING OFFENSE IS PENDING
DISPOSITION.
The General Assembly of North Carolina enacts:
Section 1. G.S. 15A-1340.14(b) reads as rewritten:
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which the legislature included DWI convictions to count as one
point towards a defendant's prior record level in felony sentencing.
Viewed alone, the amendment is one that takes notice of the seriousness of the problems of impaired driving and attempts to make
things a little bit harder on those who do it. However, because the
Structured Sentencing Act is linked to so many other statutes,
problems arise.
As a result of this, North Carolina courts are presented with a
case like State v Gentry.18 When the legislature passes amendments to statutes that are part of a system, without looking for
possible future controversy with other statutes in that system, litigation arises and lives can be adversely affected. It is the duty of
the courts to interpret the meaning and scope of the laws of the
land, as set forth by the General Assembly. Courts are generally
hesitant to enter the domain of the legislature and, in effect, write
new law. However, when glitches are created in the statutory
scheme by random amendments, filling in the blanks left by the
General Assembly is sometimes a better choice, especially when a
"(b) Points.-Points are assigned as follows:
(1) For each prior felony Class A conviction, 10 points.
(ia) For each prior felony Class B1 conviction, 9 points.
(2) For each prior felony Class B2, C, or D conviction, 6 points.
(3) For each prior felony Class E, F, or G conviction, 4 points.
(4) For each prior felony Class H or I conviction, 2 points.

(5) For each prior Class Al or Class 1 misdemeanor

CONVICTION OR PRIOR

G.S. 20-138.1, one point, except
that convictions for Class 1 misdemeanor offenses under Chapter 20 of
the General Statutes, other than conviction for misdemeanor death by
vehicle AND CONVICTION FOR IMPAIRED DRIVING IN A COMMERCIAL VEHICLE
(G.S. 20-138.2), shall not be assigned any points for purposes of
determining a person's prior record for felony sentencing.
(6) If all the elements of the present offense are included in the prior
offense, 1 point
(7) If the offense was committed while the offender was on probation or
parole, or while the offender was serving a sentence of imprisonment, or
while the offender was on escape from a correctional institution while
serving a sentence of imprisonment, 1 point.
For purposes of determining prior record points under this subsection, a
conviction for a first degree rape or a first degree sexual offense
committed prior to the effective date of this subsection shall be treated
as a felony Class 1 conviction, and a conviction for any other
subsection shall be treated as a felony Class B2 conviction.
(emphasis added).
18. Gentry, No. COA98-1225, 1999 N.C. App. LEXIS 916.
IMPAIRED DRIVING CONVICTION
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violation of a defendant's rights and increased prison time is at
stake.
III.

STATUTORY INCONSISTENCY

The DWI/Felony Prior Record Level Amendment 19 modifies
the Structured Sentencing Act 2" of 1994.21 Specifically, it amends
G.S. 15A-1340.14(b)(5) 2 2 to provide that, as of December 1, 1997,
in determining an offender's prior record level with regard to sentencing for a felony, prior convictions of impaired driving under
G.S. 20-138.123 count as one point. Before this amendment, no
points were assessed to an offender's prior record for a DWI
conviction.
Seen by itself, the amendment is one that recognizes a legitimate problem within the state. It is an action, taken by the legislature, to further the state's movement to thwart impaired
24
driving. It is also well within the legislatures' power to do so.
However, as said before, changes to one statute may create
glitches in the legislative intent because that statute belongs to a
system of other statutes.2 5 Therefore, a look at the system as a
whole is required before the amendment can be deemed as problem free.
When the amendment is viewed in the context of the entire
system of crimes and their punishment, problems appear; specifically in the context of the Habitual Impaired Driving Statute,2 6
G.S. 20-138.5, and the Habitual Felon Statutes, 27 G.S. 14-7.1
through 7.6, as evidenced by the State v. Gentry case.
19. Short Title to 1997 N.C. Sess. Laws 486, (H 183).
20. Article 81B, N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 15A-1340.10-15A-1340.23 (1994).
21. 1994 N.C. Sess. Laws 767, effective October 1, 1994.
22. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.14 (1997)-Titled "Prior record level for felony
sentencing."
23. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-138.1 (1993)-Titled "Impaired Driving."
24. See State v. Priddy, 115 N.C. App. 547, 549, 445 S.E. 2d 610, 612 (1994);
("The Legislature, unless it is limited by constitutional provisions imposed by the
State and Federal Constitutions, has the inherent power to define and punish
any act as a crime, because it is indisputably a part of the police power of the
State."); see N.C. Const. Art. I, sec.6.
25. See supra note 13.
26. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-138.5 (Supp. 1998).-Titled "Habitual impaired
driving."
27. Article 2A, N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 14-7.1-14-7.6 (Supp. 1998).
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Impaired driving, as set forth in G.S. 20-138.1,21 is a misdemeanor. As such, punishments for impaired driving convictions
are not effected by the amendment. 29 However, habitual impaired
driving, as set forth in G.S. 20-138.5,3 0 is effected. The habitual
impaired driving statute sets forth two elements: 1) offender drove
while impaired as defined in G.S. 20-138.1, and 2) has been convicted of three or more offenses involving impaired driving as
defined in G.S. 20-4.01 (24a) within seven years of the date of the
offense in question. 3 1 Basically, if a defendant is convicted of a
DWI charge within seven years of her three previous impaired
driving convictions, the defendant is guilty. This statute converts
what was a misdemeanor into a Class F felony 3 2 bringing the sentencing of the defendant under the Structured Sentencing
regime. 3 3 It is here that the full impact of the legislature's amendment is seen.
In a habitual impaired driving trial, the State has to prove
the three prior convictions to satisfy the second element. 4
Assuming that the defendant is proven guilty of the present DWI
as well, the conviction is complete. The defendant is then sentenced under the Structured Sentencing Act, which requires a
finding of the defendant's prior record level.3 5 In calculating the
defendant's prior record level for purposes of sentencing, some
prosecutors had been, prior to the Gentry case, using the very convictions used as elements of the present offense of habitual
impaired driving to increase the defendant's prior record level.
Thus, the defendant's past convictions had come back at him or
her two-fold: they increase the present offense from a misdemeanor to a Class F felony and increase the defendant's prior record level to at least a Level 11.36 This "two-timing" has been going
on as long as the amendment has been in effect, and there is no
telling how many people have been adversely affected by conviction under this amendment.
28. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-138.1 (1993)-Titled "Impaired driving."
29. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-138.1(d) and N.C. Gen. Stat. sec. 15A-1340.10.
30. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-138.5 (Supp. 1998).
31. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-138.5(a).
32. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-138.5(b).
33. Article 81B, N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 15A-1340.10-15A-1340.23 (1994).
34. For purposes of this note, assume that such prior convictions are all DWI's
from N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-138.1.
35. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.14.
36. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.14 and 15A-1340.17.
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There is no statutory prohibition on the books to prevent this
result.' The Gentry court recognized this fact:
The habitual impaired driving statute, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-138.5,
is silent on the issue of whether prior DWI convictions which were
used to establish this felony charge
may again be considered and
38
assigned points at sentencing.
This fact may lead one to think that the legislature intended
it to be so. However, it is not quite that clear. The DWI/Felony
Prior Record Level amendment was passed without reference to
such sentencing repercussions. 39 The legislature may have
passed the amendment unaware of the ramifications of their
action, making their intent hard to determine. It is no secret that
Structured Sentencing is the basis for which felonies in our state
are punished. Proper research by the legislature would have
revealed that it has already dealt with a similar problem in the
state's habitual felon statutes.40 Without legislative intervention
clarifying the habitual impaired driving statute, the courts must
deal with the problem of determining their intent. Meanwhile,
people like Tanya Gentry may have had to pay a higher price
because of the legislature's failure to act.
The habitual felon statutes are the products of the legislature's efforts to thwart repeat offenders.4 1 The statutes do not create a separate crime but a status that attaches to a defendant
with the requisite record of three prior felony convictions. 42 A
defendant on trial for a felony with a record of three prior felony
convictions can be charged as a habitual felon. If convicted of the
underlying felony and of being a habitual felon, the defendant is
sentenced for the underlying felony as if she had committed a
Class C felony, regardless of the present offense. 3
As with the crime of habitual impaired driving and other felonies, the sentencing procedure for a habitual felon is through the
Structured Sentencing Act and a prior record level is required.4
Up until 1995, prior felony convictions used to establish the status
of habitual felon were also used to increase a defendant's prior
37.
38.
39.
40.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-138.5 (Supp. 1998).
Gentry, No. COA98-1225, 1999 N.C. App. LEXIS 916.
Committee Minutes from the Legislative history of the amendment.
N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 14-7.1-14-7.6 (Supp. 1998).

41. Id.

42. See State v. Smith, 112 N.C. App. 512, 436 S.E.2d 160 (1993).
43. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 14-7.1 and 14-7.6.
44. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.14 and 15A-1340.17.
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1999
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record level in sentencing, in the same fashion that prior DWI convictions were used in the habitual impaired driving sentencing of
Tanya Gentry.4 5 However, in 1993, the Legislature amended the
habitual felon statutes to prevent this process from continuing.46
The amendment did not take effect until 1995. 4 ' After the amendment, G.S. 14-7.6 read "In determining the prior record level, convictions used to establish a person's status as an habitual felon
shall not be used."48 It is clear that the legislature did not wish to
allow a prior conviction to be used to establish both the status of
habitual felon and prior record level.
It would seem that the legislature failed to ascertain potential
problems and forgot to enact a similar prohibition in the habitual
impaired driving statute. The statutes are similar in that prior
convictions are necessary to invoke the statute, and prior record
levels are necessary to complete sentencing. In the habitual felon
context you cannot use a prior conviction for both, but prior convictions have been used for both in the habitual impaired driving
context. What happens when the habitual felon statutes and the
habitual impaired driving statute come together? For example, a
defendant who is charged with an underlying felony and as a
habitual felon has prior convictions that include habitual
impaired driving. Along with two other prior felony convictions,
the prosecutor may have chosen to use the habitual impaired driving conviction to establish the defendant as a habitual felon. In
doing so, the habitual impaired driving conviction could not be
used to increase the defendant's prior record level because of G.S.
14-7.6. 4 9 However, the DWI convictions were technically not used
to establish the defendant's status as a habitual felon. The prosecutor would then have used those convictions to increase the prior
record level. The legislature does not give a definitive answer to
whether or not this is what they intended to happen. This situation illustrates the loophole in the statutory sentencing scheme
that has existed since enactment of the amendment. Three points
on a defendant's prior record level may or may not make a difference in the amount of time a defendant has to serve.5 0 It did to
Tanya Gentry.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

State v. Truesdale, 123 N.C. App. 639, 642, 473 S.E.2d 670, 672 (1996).
1993 N.C. Sess. Laws 538.
Id.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-7.6 (Supp. 1998).
Id.
See N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 15A-1340.14 and 15A-1340.17.
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STATE CASE LAW

Statutes punishing recidivist criminals were passed as part of
a movement to stop repeat offenders within the last decade and a
half in our country.5 1 State and federal courts around the country
have had to deal with attacks on such statutes from all angles
including: constitutional attacks of equal protection, due process
of law, freedom from double jeopardy, and cruel and unusual punishment.5 2 North Carolina courts have dealt with the habitual
felon statutes and the habitual impaired driving statute previously. These cases are presented here to show the backdrop the
court had to reference its decision in Gentry.
The North Carolina Supreme Court has dealt with the constitutional issues concerning the habitual felon statutes in State v.
Allen, 5 3 in 1977, and State v Todd, 54 in 1985.
In Allen, the North Carolina Supreme Court wrote that the
North Carolina Habitual Felons Act was the type of procedure
that "seems to be the fairest and least susceptible to constitutional
attack."55 The Allen court held that:
The only reason for establishing that an accused is a habitual
felon is to enhance the punishment, which would otherwise be
appropriate for the substantive felony, which he has allegedly
committed while in such a status. The effect of such a proceeding
"is to enhance the punishment of those found guilty of crime who
are also shown to have been convicted of other crimes in the
past".56 Being a habitual felon is not a crime but is a status the
attaining of which subjects a person thereafter convicted of a
51. See 39 Am Jur 2d "Habitual Criminals" §§ 1-5 (1999).
52. Id. at §§ 5-14.
53. State v. Allen, 292 N.C. 431, 233 S.E.2d 585 (1977).
54. State v. Todd, 313 N.C. 110, 326 S.E.2d 249 (1985).
55. Allen, 292 N.C. at 435, 233 S.E.2d at 588 (quoting 40 N.Y.U.L.Rev. at
348.) The Court explains:
The defendant has notice that he is to be charged as a recidivist before
pleading to the present offense, eliminating the possibility that he will
enter a guilty plea on the expectation that the maximum punishment he
could receive would be that provided for in the statute defining the
present crime. Moreover, while notice is given before pleading, only the
allegation of the present crime is read and proved to the jury at the first
trial, preventing any prejudice due to the introduction of evidence of
prior convictions before the trier of guilt for the present offense.
56. Allen, 292 N.C. at 435, 233 S.E.2d at 588 (quoting Spencer v. Texas, 385
U.S. 554 (1967)).
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crime to an increased punishment for that crime. The status
57
itself, standing alone, will not support a criminal sentence.
The court in Allen was not directly faced with the constitutional issues listed above, rather it ruled on a procedural issue
within the statute. However, the North Carolina Supreme Court
did face those issues in State v. Todd,5" in which it followed the
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States.5 9 The federal cases had dispatched the constitutional challenges to the
recidivist statutes, proclaiming that the state legislatures did
indeed have the power to increase punishment for qualified
offenders. In Todd, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that
"our legislature has acted within constitutionally permissible
bounds in enacting legislation designed to identify habitual
criminals and to authorize enhanced punishment as provided.
The procedures set forth in G.S. 14-7.1 to 7.6 likewise comport
with the defendant's federal and state constitutional guarantees."6 0 The habitual felon statutes were later amended in 1993 to
change the language in G.S. 14-7.6 to prohibit "two-timing." Thus,
the North Carolina Supreme Court found that in 1985, though not
presented with the specific "two-timing" issue, G.S. 14-7.6 was
constitutional without such prohibition."
The North Carolina Supreme Court ruled on that "two-timing" issue, similar to the issue in Gentry, in State v. Roper.62 This
case pre-dated the Structured Sentencing Act, therefore the
defendant was punished under the Fair Sentencing Act.6 8 Under
the Fair Sentencing Act and the prior habitual felon statutes,
there were different sentencing procedures and none of the pres57. Allen, 292 N.C. at 435, 233 S.E.2d at 588.
58. Todd, 313 N.C. 110.
59. Todd, 313 N.C. at 117, 326 S.E.2d at 253.
The Court began by:
[r]ejecting outright the suggestion that our legislature is
constitutionally prohibited from enhancing punishment for habitual
offenders as violations of constitutional structures dealing with double
jeopardy, ex post facto laws, cruel and unusual punishment, due
process, equal protection, and privileges and immunities. These
challenges have been addressed and rejected by the United States
Supreme Court. See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980), and
Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. State v. Roper, 328 N.C. 337 (1991).
63. Article 81A, N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 15A-1340.1-15A-1340.7. Repealed by
1993 N.C. Sess. Laws 538.
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol22/iss1/7
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ent prohibitions on using prior convictions. 64 The Roper court
held that the trial court did not err in using a prior conviction to
establish the defendant's habitual felon status and as an aggravating factor for sentencing purposes. 6' The defendant unsuccessfully relied on State v. Blackwelder, where it was held to be an
error to consider an element of the crime to also be a factor in
aggravation. 6 6 In Blackwelder, the defendant was convicted of
assault with a deadly weapon, in which the use of a deadly
weapon is an element. 6 7 The fact that the defendant used a
deadly weapon in the commission of the crime was considered by
the trial court to be an aggravating factor in sentencing. 6s The
court in Blackwelder held that "an essential element of the underlying crime may not also be asserted as an aggravating factor for
that crime, since those factors were presumably considered in
determining the presumptive sentence for the offense." 69 The
Roper court stated:
Here, the status of habitual felon merely enhances the punishment of another crime, and that status is not a crime in and of
itself. The Blackwelder limitation thus does not apply because
these convictions for prior crimes were not essential elements of
the crime for which defendant was convicted. We hold that the
evidence of defendant's prior crimes was properly used to establish
the status of a habitual felon as well as to establish the aggravating factor of prior felony convictions
to increase the presumptive
70
sentence of the underlying felony.
Today, the sentencing issue in Roper would have been decided
differently because of the prohibitions in the sentencing scheme
now in place. 71 However, the Blackwelder limitation is on point in
64. Roper, 328 N.C. 337, pre-dated the 1993 amendment to G.S. 14-7.6, which
prohibited using prior convictions to establish both habitual felon status and
prior record level. In Roper, the use of prior convictions to establish habitual
felon status and aggravating factors increasing the presumptive sentence was
upheld. See note 67.
65. Roper, 328 N.C. 337, 363, 402 S.E.2d 600, 615 (1991).
66. State v. Blackwelder, 309 N.C. 410, 306 S.E. 2d 783 (1983).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Roper, 328 N.C. at 363, 402 S.E.2d at 615. See also State v. Kirkpatrick,
345 NC 451, 480 S.E.2d 400 (1997).
71. See Truesdale, 123 N.C. App. at 642, 473 S.E.2d at 672 (1996). Structured
Sentencing still considers aggravating and mitigating factors in determining
whether to leave the presumptive sentencing range in G.S. 15A-1340.16 and .17.
The presence or absence of prior convictions are no longer aggravating or
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1999
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the habitual impaired driving situation. The courts have decided
that habitual impaired driving is a substantive felony offense.7 2
The prior convictions of DWI are certainly essential elements of
the underlying crime.7 3 Under the Fair Sentencing Act, the
Blackwelder limitation would have prevented the prior convictions from being counted as aggravating factors. An analogous
argument could be made in favor of a defendant like Tanya Gentry
under the current Structured Sentencing Act.
The North Carolina Supreme Court has not made a ruling
since Roper that directly addresses this issue; however, the North
Carolina Court of Appeals has made several significant holdings
in this area.
4 the court re-emphasized the North CarIn State v Penland,"
olina Supreme Court ruling in Allen that being an habitual felon
is not a crime but is a status that, standing alone, will not support
a criminal sentence.7 5 The defendant in Penland was charged
with an underlying felony and with being a habitual felon.7 6 The
defendant was sentenced for each charge receiving a sentence of
18 years for being a habitual felon, and two years for the underlying felony.7 7 The court held that upon a conviction as a habitual
felon, the trial court must sentence the defendant for the underlying felony as a Class C felon.7" The habitual felon status attaches
to the underlying felony, boosting whatever felony class it was to a
Class C, but it cannot support an independent sentence.
State v. Smith further defines the meaning of "status."7 9 In
Smith, the defendant had been adjudicated as a habitual felon
before this particular trial.8 0 He claimed that he could not be
declared a habitual felon again without three new felonies."' The
court held that this was not the intent of the legislature, otherwise
the state would have to wait until an already adjudicated habitual
felon committed three more felonies before he could be sentenced
mitigating factors, since Structured Sentencing takes them into consideration
when calculating Prior Record Level in G.S. 15A-1340.14.
72. Priddy, 115 N.C. App. 547, 445 S.E.2d 610.
73. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-138.5 (Supp. 1998).
74. 89 N.C. App. 350, 365 S.E.2d 721 (1988).
75. Id. at 351, 365 S.E.2d at 722.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Smith, 112 N.C. App 512, 436 S.E.2d 160.
80. Id. at 514, 436 S.E.2d at 162.
81. Id. at 517, 436 S.E.2d at 162.
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as a habitual felon again.12 Being a habitual felon is a status, that
once attained is never lost.8 3 Prior felony convictions can be used
8 4
to establish habitual felon status as many times as necessary.
The court explained that "if the legislature had wanted to require
the State to show proof of three new underlying felonies before a
new habitual felon indictment could issue, then the legislature
could have easily have stated such. We will not rewrite the statute."8 5 This explanation shows the reluctance of the court to, in
effect, write new law instead of interpreting existing law. Smith
illustrates that the legislature has to be clear on what they wish to
prohibit.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals first dealt with habitual
impaired driving in 1994. In State v. Priddy, 6 the court was
asked if the habitual impaired driving statute constituted a substantive felony offense or a mere punishment enhancing statute
like the habitual felon statutes. The court stated that the legislature had chosen the language in the habitual felon statutes to simply define those persons who are subject to greater punishment,
while it chose "specific language to define the crime of habitual
impaired driving as a separate felony offense, capable of supporting a criminal sentence."8 ' The court held, in light of this difference, that the legislature intended habitual impaired driving to be
a separate, substantive felony offense, and not a punishment
88
enhancing statute.
The next logical step in the connection between habitual felon
and habitual impaired driving statutes was taken in State v. Baldwin .89 In Baldwin, the defendant was found to be a habitual felon
on the basis of three felony convictions, one of which was a habitual impaired driving conviction.9" The court in Baldwin stated
that since habitual impaired driving was proclaimed to be a separate, substantive felony offense in Priddy, "a conviction for that
offense may serve as the basis for enhancement to habitual felon
status "91
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Smith, 112 N.C. App. at 517, 436 S.E.2d at 162.
Priddy, 115 N.C. App. 547, 445 S.E.2d 610 (1994).
Id. at 549, 445 S.E.2d at 612.
Id.
State v. Baldwin, 117 N.C. App 713, 453 S.E.2d 193 (1995).
Id.
Id. at 716, 453 S.E.2d at 194.

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1999

13

224

Campbell
Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [1999], Art. 7
CAMPBELL LAw REVIEW

[Vol. 22:211

The North Carolina Court of Appeals continued its interpretation of the Structured Sentencing Act and habitual felon statutes
in State v. Bethea.92 The defendant in Bethea was found to be a
habitual felon.9 3 He claimed that the trial court erred in calculating his prior record level when it increased it by virtue of G.S.
15A-1340.14(b)(6) and (b)(7).94 The defendant in Bethea was
charged with breaking and entering and felonious larceny, crimes
he had previously been convicted of in 1992. 91 In 1994, he was
convicted of possession of cocaine. 96 Bethea was on probation for
the cocaine conviction when he committed the offenses in the case
in question.9 7 As a result, one point was added to his prior record
level because elements of the present offense are included in a
prior offense and another point was added because he committed
the offense while on probation.9" The 1992 and 1994 convictions
were both used along with a 1993 conviction for larceny of a firearm to establish him as a habitual felon. 9 9 The defendant claimed
that this use of his prior convictions violated the prohibition in
G.S. 14-7.6.100 The court explained the importance of G.S. 14-7.6:
The chief limitation on the use of G.S. 15A-1340.14 is found in
G.S. 14-7.6, which states that "[iun determining the prior record
level, convictions used to establish a person's status as an habitual
felon shall not be used." This provision recognizes that there are
two independent avenues by which a defendant's sentence may be

increased based on the existence of priorconvictions. A defendant's
prior convictions will either serve to establish a defendant's status
as an habitual felon pursuant to G.S. 14-7.1 or to increase a
defendant's prior record level pursuant to G.S. 15A-1340.14(1)-(5).
G.S. 14-7.6 establishes clearly, however, that the existence of prior
convictions may not be used to increase a defendant's
sentence
10 1
pursuant to both provisions at the same time.
92. State v. Bethea, 122 N.C. App. 623, 471 S.E.2d 430 (1996).
93. Id. at 624, 471 S.E.2d at 431.

94. N.C. Gen. Stat. 15A-1340.14(b)(6) and (b)(7). See note 15 for the full text
on page 3 and 4.
95. Bethea, 122 N.C. App. at 624, 471 S.E.2d at 431.
96. Id.

97. Id.
98. Id.

99. Id.
100. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-7.6 (Supp. 1998). This prohibition went into effect
Jan. 1, 1995.
101. Bethea, 122 N.C. App. at 626, 471 S.E.2d at 432 (emphasis added).
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The Bethea court held that the use of the defendant's prior
convictions was not error, because "G.S. 15A-1340.14(b)(6) and
(b)(7) address the gravity and circumstances surrounding the
offense for which the defendant [was then] being sentenced, rather
than the mere existence of a prior offense."1 °2 When a sentence is
increased by one of the two independent avenues, either by establishing the defendant as a habitual felon or increasing the defendant's prior record level, the only consideration is that a prior
conviction exists. In this case, however, it was not the existence of
a prior conviction that mattered, it was the fact that the defendant
had committed the same crime before and that he committed the
crime while he was on probation. Granted, the existence of a prior
conviction is necessary, but the real focus of G.S. 15A1340.14(b)(6) and (b)(7) is to increase the punishment for those
who repeat behavior after they have had more than adequate
notice of its illegality.
Bethea evidences that the practice of "two-timing" in the
habitual felon context had been abolished. "Two-timing," using
prior convictions to establish a defendant as a habitual felon and
to increase the defendant's prior record level, was not prohibited
by the legislature until 1995, when G.S. 14-7.6 was amended. 10 3
The effect of that amendment is clear from the above excerpt from
Bethea. The defendant in Bethea was claiming that he had been
"two-timed" in 1996. Although it was similar, it was held not to be
"two-timing" because the prior convictions themselves were only
used to establish the defendant as a habitual felon. Thus, the trial
court had only used one of the independent avenues recognized by
G.S.14-7.6.
"Two-timing" found new life in the 1997 DWI/Felony Prior
Record Level Amendment. In the situation where a defendant's
habitual impaired driving conviction was used to establish him to
be a habitual felon, that habitual impaired driving conviction
could not be used to increase his prior record level. But because of
the 1997 amendment, DWI convictions used to convict a defendant of habitual impaired driving could have been used to increase
his prior record level. At the habitual impaired driving trial, the
DWI convictions could have been used in a like manner. Once the
State had elevated the crime from a misdemeanor to a felony
102. Id. at 627, 471 S.E.2d at 432, 433.
103. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-7.6 (Supp. 1998). This prohibition went into effect
Jan. 1, 1995.
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charge with the DWI convictions, those same convictions would
have been used to increase the defendant's prior record level.
In 1996, the North Carolina Court of Appeals revisited the
habitual felon and habitual impaired driving context in State v.
Misenheimer.1 04 The Misenheimer court ruled on the issue of
whether a defendant could be established as a habitual felon by
use of prior convictions that were also used as elements of the
underlying felony. 10 5 The defendant was charged with felony
habitual impaired driving and as being a habitual felon.' °6 The
habitual impaired driving charge was based on three prior convictions of habitual impaired driving. 10 7 He was convicted of the
present habitual impaired driving charge.' 08 The State, in its
habitual felon indictment, alleged the following three felonies: 1)
sale of cocaine - 1992, 2) habitual impaired driving - 1993, 3)
habitual impaired driving - 1994.109 Both of the habitual
impaired driving convictions (2 &3) had been used to convict the
defendant on the underlying charge of habitual impaired driving. 110 The court re-emphasized the "two independent avenues"
and held that such use of prior convictions was not prohibited by
the legislature:
Although we agree that the offenses of habitual driving on { 1993
and 1994}, which were used to establish defendant's status as an
habitual felon, were elements of the habitual impaired driving
conviction for which defendant was sentenced, the legislature has
not prohibited the use of these offenses in establishing a defendant's status as an habitual felon. In this case, defendant was con11 1
victed of habitual impaired driving, which is a Class G felony.
Defendant was then adjudicated a habitual felon, to be sentenced
as a Class C felon. Only at this point, at sentencing, does the legislative prohibition in section 14-7.6 apply. Defendant has not
argued and indeed, the record does not show that his prior record
level was established by using convictions necessary to adjudge
him a habitual felon. Thus, there was no violation of the legislative prohibition...112
104. State v. Misenheimer, 123 N.C. App. 156, 472 S.E.2d 191 (1996).
Misenheimer was decided less than a month after Bethea.
105. Id. at 157, 472 S.E.2d at 192.

106. Id.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Misenheimer, 123 N.C. App. at 157, 472 S.E.2d at 192.

111. It is now a class F felony. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-138.5 (Supp. 1998).
112. Misenheimer, 123 N.C. App. at 158, 472 S.E.2d at 193.
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The 1993 and 1994 convictions were used to establish the
defendant as a habitual felon. This is one of the independent avenues. The other avenue, increasing prior record level, was not
shown to have been used. Thus, the G.S. 14-7.6 prohibition was
not violated. The defendant in Misenheimer was essentially arguing that there was a third independent avenue, establishing a
defendant as a habitual felon with convictions used to prove the
underlying felony. The court held that G.S. 14-7.6 only includes
the original "two independent avenues," because it applies only to
the habitual felon charge, and has nothing to do with the underlying felony. 1 13 It should be noted that the Blackwelder prohibition
would not have been violated because, while it prohibits essential
elements of a crime from being used as factors in aggravation,
being established as a habitual felon is not the kind of aggravating
factor the Blackwelder limitation encompasses.
In Misenheimer, as in Smith, the court refused to "rewrite the
statute," reiterating its stance that the legislature must make
clear what they intend to prohibit. The appellate courts have
tended to follow what they have discerned as the overall legislative intent for the Structured Sentencing Act, which is that it generally provides for more severe punishment for recidivist
crimes. 1 4 The courts have assumed that the legislature intended
for the harshest possible result.'1 5 This is the problem when the
legislature passes something like the DWI/Felony Prior Record
Level amendment without running it through the gauntlet of
North Carolina crimes and their punishment. The G.S. 14-7.6
prohibition shows that the legislature had considered "two-timing" and abolished the practice in one context, but recreated the
whole problem in this smaller context.
However, the Misenheimer opinion used some interesting language that may have a bearing on the problem of the 1997 amendment in the habitual felon context. The court indicated that G.S.
14-7.6 would prohibit not just convictions used to establish a person's status, but "convictions necessary to adjudge him an habitual
113. Id.
114. Bethea, 122 N.C. App. 623, 627-28, 471 S.E.2d 430, 432-33.
"The cardinal rule of statutory construction is that "the intent of the legislature
controls the interpretation of a statute." Tellado v. TiCaro Corp., 119 N.C. App.
529, 533, 459 S.E.2d 27, 30 (1995). In determining the legislative intent, we
"should consider the language of the statute, the spirit of the act, and what the
act seeks to accomplish" Id.
115. Id.
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felon."11 6 If G.S. 14-7.6 were to be construed as such, the problem
of crossing the "two independent avenues" by using habitual
impaired driving to establish habitual felon status, then using the
three DWI convictions (from the habitual impaired driving conviction) to increase the defendant's prior record level would appear to
be solved. The court could find that the prior DWI convictions
were necessary to the habitual impaired driving conviction, which
in turn was necessary for establishing the status of habitual felon.
The DWI's would still have counted in sentencing for the habitual
impaired driving charge by itself, but at least part of the problem
would be eliminated.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals did not stay with the
language "convictions necessary" very long. 1 1 7 In State v. Truesdale, 1l8 the court was again asked to rule on an aspect of G.S.147.6. The Truesdale case dealt with the relationship between G.S.
14-7.6 and G.S. 15A-1340.14(d), which prohibits the use of more
than one conviction obtained during the same calendar week to
increase the defendant's prior record level. 1 9 The defendant in
Truesdale had been convicted of multiple felonies on different
occasions. 2 ° The court found "nothing in these statutes to prohibit the court from using one conviction obtained in a single calendar week to establish habitual felon status and using another
separate conviction obtained the same week to determine prior
record level."' 2 ' Again the court emphasized that the lack of a
specific prohibition by the legislature as to the attempted use of
prior convictions would, in essence, prove to be a nod of
acquiescence.
In defining the meaning of G.S. 14-7.6, the Truesdale court
stated that "the language and plain meaning of G.S. 14-7.6 prohibits using the same convictions to establish both habitual felon status and prior record level."' 2 2 The potential solution to the
problem with the DWI/Felony Prior Record Level amendment in
Misenheimer was apparently blocked by the courts change of definition from convictions necessary to same convictions. Under the
116. Misenheimer, 123 N.C. App. at 158, 472 S.E.2d at 193. (emphasis added).
117. Truesdale was decided a month later.
118. 123 N.C. App. 639, 473 S.E.2d 670 (1996).
119. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.14(d) - Multiple Prior Convictions Obtained
In One Court Week
120. Truesdale, 123 N.C. App. at 641, 473 S.E.2d at 671.
121. Truesdale, 123 N.C. App. at 642, 473 S.E.2d at 672.
122. Id. (emphasis added).
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"same conviction" definition, the court would allow the DWI convictions to be used to increase the prior record level because the
legislature has not prohibited such use of prior conviction by
amending the habitual impaired driving statute as it has done
with G.S. 14-7.6.
V.

THE GENTRY DECISION

The North Carolina Court of Appeals heard the case of Tanya
Gentry on August 24, 1999.123 At issue was whether the trial
court had erred at the sentencing hearing in assigning points to
Gentry's three prior DWI convictions in her prior record level,
because those same three DWI convictions were the basis for her
12 4
habitual impaired driving charge.
The court in Gentry explained the procedure under G.S. 15A1340.14 for determining prior record level, including the language
from the 1997 amendment, making prior DWI convictions add one
point to the prior record level. It noted that the trial court arrived
at a total of ten points, placing Gentry at a prior record level of IV,
with a presumptive sentence of 20 to 25 months. 2 5 The court also
noted that without the three points from the DWI convictions,
Gentry would have been placed at a prior record level of III, with a
1 26
presumptive sentence of 17 to 21 months.
As previously noted, Gentry's argument was not constitutional in nature, but rather asserted that the use of the convictions in the "two-timing" manner was "contrary to the laws of this
state." 2 7 It has been shown by this note that such usage is not
directly contrary to the laws of this state. There is no law that
prohibits "two-timing" of DWI convictions. The only evidence of
any such prohibition comes from two possible sources: 1) the
Blackwelder limitation from the Fair Sentencing Act, argued in
the Roper case and, 2) the habitual felon statues defined by subsequent case law.
The Blackwelder limitation 1 28 prevented an essential element
of the crime from being asserted as an aggravating factor for that
crime. Under the Structured Sentencing Act, prior convictions are
no longer considered to be aggravating factors because they are
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Gentry, No. COA98-1225, 1999 N.C. App. LEXIS 916.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Gentry, No. COA98-1225, 1999 N.C. App. LEXIS 916, *5.
Blackwelder, 309 N.C. 410 (1983). See infra note 64 and text.

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1999

19

230

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [1999], Art. 7
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:211

taken into account when determining the prior record level of the
defendant. 1 29 Since prior record level was once an aggravating
factor, it could be argued that the Blackwelder limitation prevents
the result in the Gentry case. The DWI convictions are clearly
essential elements of the habitual impaired driving offense. 130 It
could have been argued that the limitation prevented essential
elements of the crime from being asserted as prior convictions
towards the defendant's prior record level. The reasoning behind
the limitation that "those [essential elements] were presumably
considered in determining the presumptive sentence for the
offense" would still be valid.13 1 The situation in Roper and the
prior habitual felon statutes would not negate the limitation,
because the prior convictions go to the crime for which the defendant was convicted, not the status applied afterwards.
The Gentry court made no mention of the Blackwelder limitation in its decision. Instead, after the court took notice that32the
it
habitual impaired driving statute was silent on the issue,
33
The court went
immediately began to discuss legislative intent.
to the second source mentioned above; the habitual felon context,
stating:
The obvious legislative purpose of the habitual felon statute is to
increase sharply the punishment for those persons who continue
to commit serious offenses in violation of our criminal laws. N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 14-7.6, which governs the sentencing of persons found
to be habitual felons, provides that "in determining the prior record level, convictions used to establish a person's status as an
habitual felon shall not be used."' 34
The Gentry court then cited the excerpt from State v.
On the basis of these two passages, the court held:
Bethea.
Obviously, our legislature recognized the basic unfairness and
constitutional restrictions on using the same convictions both to
elevate a defendant's sentencing status to that of an habitual
felon, and then to increase his sentencing level. We believe it reasonable to conclude that that same legislature did not intend that
the convictions which elevate a misdemeanor driving while
impaired conviction to the status of the felony of habitual driving
129. See N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 15A-1340.14 and 15A-1340.16.

130. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-138.5(a).
131. Blackwelder, 309 N.C. 410 (1983).
132. Gentry, No. COA98-1225, 1999 N.C. App. LEXIS 916. See infra note 36.
133. Id. See note 110.

134. Id.
135. Bethea, 122 N.C. App. 623, 626, 471 S.E.2d 430, 432. See note 97.
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while impaired, would then136again be used to increase the sentencing level of the defendant.
Thus, the court reversed and remanded for resentencing in
accordance with the opinion.
The court in Gentry looked for legislative intent, saw what the
legislature had done before with the similar problem, and
assumed that it would want to do it again. It would be interesting
to know the thoughts of the court on the subject of why the legislature created the problem in the first place, seeing that it had
already corrected itself once. The decision of the court to prohibit
this type of "two-timing" by expanding a statute that does not
apply to this particular context seems to make the Blackwelder
limitation argument a more viable basis for the decision in this
case. This is so especially in light of the Smith, Misenheimer and
Truesdale decisions, where the court refused to disallow uses of
prior convictions because the legislature had not prohibited the
use. The court in those cases made a point that since there was no
legislative prohibition, then it was presumably allowed. The Gentry case was different in that there was a legislative prohibition on
point, just in another context. It might have been easier to take
notice of the Blackwelder limitation than to in effect rewrite the
statute, as the court refused to do in Smith.
The Gentry court did note the State's argument that the difference between the status of habitual felon and the substantive
felony crime of habitual impaired driving justified the use of prior
convictions.13 7 By holding that the difference is inconsequential
in the present context, the court narrowed the meaning of the difference to the Smith, Priddy and Baldwin cases. Essentially, the
habitual felon status cannot be lost, and is not capable of supporting a criminal sentence standing alone. The substantive offense of
habitual impaired driving is like the habitual felon status in that
a defendant's convictions can be used over again, but it is capable
of supporting a criminal sentence standing alone.
The Gentry case, from whatever perspective, prevents the
"two-timing" of DWI convictions in both the habitual impaired
driving context, and it should do so in the narrower case when a
136. Gentry, No. COA98-1225, 1999 N.C. App. LEXIS 916.
137. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-138.5 (Supp. 1998), and N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 147.1-14-7.6 (Supp. 1998). Comparing the two charges, the Court mistakenly
described both Habitual Felon and Habitual DWI as requiring the committal of
three offenses of the same class within the past seven years. There is no such
language in the habitual felon statutes.
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defendant has an habitual impaired driving conviction, and is
indicted as an habitual felon. In either case, the State can no
longer use the DWI convictions to add points to the prior record
level.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The North Carolina Court of Appeals came to the correct conclusion, methodology aside. It is "basic unfairness" that the statutes would allow the "two-timing" of a defendant's prior
convictions. 138 The language referring to the "constitutional
restrictions" is puzzling, however. 139 As previously stated, North
Carolina precedent had held the very action at issue here to be
constitutional in the habitual felon context not over a decade
ago.' 4 ° The court chose not to stay with its "no prohibition - no
foul" stance in Misenheimer and Truesdale, and not to wait for the
legislature to correct its apparent mistake.
The North Carolina General Assembly amended G.S. 15A1340.14(b)(5), of the Structured Sentencing Act, to include DWI
convictions in an effort to further stiffen the penalty for those who
drive on our highways under the influence of drugs or alcohol.The
ramification of DWI/Felony Prior Record Level amendment was
that it ran afoul of the legislature's intent in enacting G.S. 14-7.6.
It is not that this amendment is to be considered a bad or illadvised action of the legislature, for it is quite the contrary. The
problem that arose from its application only shows the great, and
sometimes convoluted, complexity of our laws. The Structured
Sentencing Act is connected to a network of other criminal statutes and procedures and the legislature must be wary of the other
statutes and past problems encountered by them when it amends
such acts.
William Thomas Kesler, Jr.

138. Gentry, No. COA98-1225, 1999 N.C. App. LEXIS 916.
139. Id.
140. Todd, 313 N.C. 110 (1985).
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